Florida Public Health Review
Volume 8

Article 1

February 2011

An Update on Red Light Camera Research: The Need for Federal
Standards in the Interest of Public Safety
Barbara Langland-Orban
John T. Large
Etienne E. Pracht

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/fphr
Part of the Public Health Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Langland-Orban, Barbara; Large, John T.; and Pracht, Etienne E. (2011) "An Update on Red Light Camera
Research: The Need for Federal Standards in the Interest of Public Safety," Florida Public Health Review:
Vol. 8, Article 1.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/fphr/vol8/iss1/1

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open
access by the Brooks College of Health at UNF Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida
Public Health Review by an authorized administrator of
UNF Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact Digital Projects.
© February 2011 Protected by original copyright, with
some rights reserved.

Langland-Orban et al.: An Update on Red Light Camera Research: The Need for Federal Stan

An Update on Red Light Camera Research:
The Need for Federal Standards in the
Interest of Public Safety
Barbara Langland-Orban, PhD, John T. Large, PhD, Etienne E. Pracht, PhD
ABSTRACT
Since publishing our critique of red light camera (RLC) studies in 2008, we have gained increased insights on the
controversy over RLCs. Herein we provide additional information on RLCs, and use a question-and-answer format
to address frequently asked questions. This update includes the rationale given for ignoring fatalities at RLC sites,
the convergence in findings from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's compendium of best RLC
studies, common violations of research methods in RLC evaluations, the RLC cost-to-benefit implications for
motorists, an explanation for the increase in rear-end crashes at RLC sites, and why RLCs may be ineffective in
reducing red light running crashes. We conclude with a proposed solution: restoring and improving federal
standards through the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices to assure proper intersection engineering prior
to consideration of RLCs (even though RLCs are not recognized as an established safety device).
Florida Public Health Review, 2011; 8, 1-9.
Background
In 2008, we published our first critique of red
light camera (RLC) studies (Langland-Orban, Pracht,
& Large, 2008). The function of RLCs is to
photograph vehicles that enter an intersection on a
red light, which results in a citation that carries a fine.
The public health concern with RLCs is the increase
in crashes and injuries being reported in some
studies.
Our critique reviewed five major RLC studies.
Four were identified in the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration's (NHTSA) Automated
Enforcement: A Compendium of Worldwide
Evaluations of Results (Decina, Thomas, Srinivasan,
& Staplin, 2007), as among the best in meeting
NHTSA’s data and research design standards among
75 RLC studies reviewed. The fifth was published in
the American Journal of Public Health (Retting &
Kyrychenko, 2002) and was the only publication
identified in a medical library search for peerreviewed publications on RLCs. The five studies had
contradictory findings with differences due primarily
to the varying adherence to research methodological
rigor. The studies that best adhered to scientific
research methods found RLCs were associated with
increases in crashes and injuries.
The basic standards used for assessing validity
when reviewing these studies were derived from
Campbell and Stanley (1963) and the Office of the
House Majority Leader's report on red light cameras
(2001), which included the following points:
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Selection bias should not be evident in the
choice of RLC or comparison sites used in
the evaluation;
 Outcomes from the RLC sites should be
separately analyzed and not merged with
untreated or dissimilar sites;
 Angle, rear-end, and total crashes (and
injury crashes) should be included as
outcome measures;
 Variables that need to be controlled for must
be included in the statistical analysis, such
as traffic volume, yellow light timings, and a
time trend as red light running crashes and
injuries are declining over time absent the
use of cameras;
 At least one year of data should be evaluated
in both before and during camera time
periods; and
 Findings from the statistical analysis should
be fully disclosed, including confidence
intervals and statistical significance.
After publishing our criticisms of the Retting and
Kyrychenko study, Mr. Retting subsequently
challenged our criticisms (Smyth, 2008). We
responded by replicating his published analysis,
which affirmed Retting and Kyrychenko (2002) had
incorrectly reported their findings, as well as used
flawed research methods. Our replication, which
explains the errors, is published in an e-letter with the
original article in the American Journal of Public
Health on-line (Large, Orban, & Pracht, 2008).
Since publishing our critique we have provided
approximately 80 interviews to news reporters

1
1

Florida Public Health Review, Vol. 8 [2011], Art. 1

throughout the U.S., Canada, and England. Our
findings were broadly circulated in the news media;
however, to date, only two elected officials have
contacted us about our conclusions. This lack of
interest among elected officials was profiled in a
news article about sources of information used in
RLC decision making, which illustrated the tactics
used by industry proponents to foster confusion about
RLC effectiveness (Van Sickler, 2010).
One journal reporter, who requested anonymity,
revealed that the media can be a source of
misinformation on RLCs. She disclosed that special
interests that profit from cameras have threatened to
reduce or withdraw their advertising revenues if the
news is not reported that RLCs provide a safety
benefit. The reporter explained that with such threats,
journalistic ethics permit an editor to report the
advertiser's perspective if also disclosing the contrary
assessment that RLCs pose a safety threat, leaving
readers to form their own conclusion. However, she
explained that not all editors abide by this principle,
which is compounded by the many controversies
surrounding RLCs. For example, a Florida newspaper
reported that their local poll found support for RLCs.
The second half of the article mentioned some of the
concerns about RLCs, which included using them to
generate revenue, failing to save lives, failing to
significantly reduce crashes, and increasing rear-end
crashes (Thalji, 2010). However, the most important
controversy was not mentioned: RLCs have been
associated with an increase in injury crashes. While
the reported controversies are true, the public health
concern with RLCs is the increase in injury crashes,
and possibly fatal crashes, as explained in the
following sections.
Because we are continually being queried on our
research, we provide highlights of our findings in a
question-and-answer format. Our purpose is to
communicate facts about RLCs by providing new
information and to answer questions frequently asked
by the news media.
What was learned about fatalities at RLC
intersections?
In our original critique (Langland-Orban et al.,
2008), we faulted the research methods used in the
Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) analysis
titled Safety Evaluation of Red-Light Cameras
(Council, Persaud, Eccles, Lyon, and Griffith, 2005).
One FHWA official subsequently contacted us to
point out that we overlooked an important finding:
fatal crashes at RLC sites had increased, yet were
ignored in the related economic analysis.
Council et al. (2005, p. 68) report the percent of
fatal angle crashes increased in the after-camera
period, as 0.5 percent of angle injury crashes were
Florida Public Health Review, 2011; 8:1-9.
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fatal before camera use and 0.8 percent were fatal
after camera use. Using this information and their
results from the seven jurisdictions, it was possible
for us to calculate that the number of fatal angle
crashes for the 370 RLC site years was expected to
be 4.5 based on before camera data. However, the
actual number of fatal angle crashes was 5.0 in the
after-camera period, which is more than 10% higher
than expected. Further, for every 100 definite injuries
from angle crashes in the before-camera period, 1.28
was fatal, which increased to 1.71 in the after-camera
period, a 33.6% increase. Therefore, increased, and
not decreased, fatalities were associated with the use
of RLCs in this study.
Additionally, the cost of fatal crashes was
omitted from the Council et al. economic analysis.
The rationale cited by the authors was that "small
numbers of fatalities should not be allowed to affect
decisions on roadway-based treatments such as
RLCs" (pp. 48-49). They suggest that fatalities at
RLC sites can be ignored because they most likely
result from a person's age (e.g., elderly) or failure to
use a safety belt, or relate to the type of vehicle
driven. Council et al. (2005) further explained they
excluded the cost of fatal crashes in their economic
analysis because the cost of a single fatal crash
"could significantly bias the results” due to the
limited number of fatal and serious crashes in their
study. In other words, the authors spotlight the
statistical difficulties of including the cost of
fatalities, while ignoring the practical implications of
such events. Consequently, their estimated annual
crash cost savings of $38,845 per RLC site is
overestimated since the cost of fatal crashes was
excluded.
Using their data, the actual estimated cost of an
angle injury crash was $82,816 before RLCs and
$100,176 after RLCs were implemented, as shown in
Table 1. Instead of using these actual costs, the
FHWA study used $64,468 for all angle injury
crashes. It appears they averaged the cost of angle
injury crashes for the before and after RLC time
periods (excluding fatal crash costs), even though the
cost of an angle injury crash was higher after RLCs
were used.
As the Council et al. study (2005) is often cited
by RLC proponents, the findings should be
reconsidered in terms of actual crash counts, in
addition to the percent changes reported. They report
that RLCs were associated with a 25% reduction in
angle crashes and a 15% increase in rear-end crashes.
However, because rear-end crashes are more frequent
than angle crashes, the total number of crashes (angle
plus rear-end) was unchanged following RLC use.
Further, the estimated reduction in injury crashes was

2
2

Langland-Orban et al.: An Update on Red Light Camera Research: The Need for Federal Stan

Table 1. Estimated Angle Injury Crash Cost by Council et al. (excluding fatal crashes) and the Actual
Average

Code
K
A
B
C

Injury Severity
Fatal
Incapacitating
Injury
Non-severe injury
Possible injury

Estimated
Cost of Angle
Crash

Before Camera
% of
Total
Weighted Cost

$0

0.50%

$0.00

0.80%

$0

$120,810
$103,468
$34,690

7.70%
30.80%
61.10%
100%
0.50%

$9,302
$31,868
$21,196

8.50%
37.40%
53.30%
100%
0.80%

$10,269
$38,697
$18,490

Average (excluding cost of fatalities)
K
Fatal
$4,090,042

$62,366
$20,450

Actual Average (including cost of fatalities)

$82,816


23 fewer definite injury crashes over 370 RLC site
years (i.e., 132 RLC sites over multiple years), which
is equivalent to each RLC site having one less
definite injury crash every 16 years. Regardless, fatal
angle crashes increased following RLC use, as did
the estimated cost of angle injury crashes. Despite the
flaws in the assumptions and analysis, the FHWA
study (Council et al., 2005) continues to be posted on
the Federal Highway Administration web site as
purported evidence of RLC effectiveness (Federal
Highway Administration, 2010).




Of the seven studies identified by the NHTSA
compendium as the best observational RLC
research, is there any consensus in the findings?
There is convergence: none of the seven studies
identified as the best in design and data in the
NHTSA's compendium (Decina et al., 2007)
statistically permit concluding RLCs provide a safety
benefit. Further, three of the seven studies report
increases in injury crashes. The methods and actual
results from each of the seven observational studies
must be reviewed to understand what each found, as
the executive summaries are often misleading or
incomplete. The studies' findings are summarized
below.
 As discussed above, Council et al. (2005)
found that RLCs were not associated with a
meaningful reduction in crashes or injuries,
particularly as fatal angle crashes increased
following RLC use, as did the estimated cost
of angle injury crashes.
 Burkey and Obeng (2004) reported a
significant increase in crashes and "possible
injury" crashes.
Florida Public Health Review, 2011; 8:1-9.
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After Camera
% of
Total
Weighted Cost

$67,456
$32,720
$100,176

Garber, Miller, Abel, Eslambolchi, and
Korukonda (2007), using Empirical Bayes,
reported RLCs were associated with a
significant increase in crashes, including
angle crashes and injury crashes, three
fatalities, and no significant change in red
light running crashes.
Synectics Transportation Consultants (2003)
reported a two percent increase in fatal and
injury crashes at RLC sites, whereas
comparison sites experienced a 12.7 percent
decrease.
Washington and Shin (2005) reported no
change in total crashes at RLC sites in
Phoenix, Arizona, and reported an 11%
decrease in total crashes in Scottsdale,
Arizona. However, the change in Scottsdale
was not significant as the confidence
interval overlaps with that of the comparison
intersections (p. 90). Also, page 18 of their
report reveals the comparison sites were
distinctly dissimilar from the RLC sites.
Comparison sites averaged 0.82 crashes
annually, whereas RLC sites averaged 33.77
crashes. Thus, the selection of comparison
sites in Scottsdale directly violates research
standards required for internal validity
pertaining to statistical regression and biases
in differential selection of the comparison
group (Campbell & Stanley, 1963, p. 5).
Finally, the percent of fatal angle crashes in
Scottsdale was higher at RLC sites than at
"all intersections" (p. 95), and their
economic analysis excluded the cost of fatal
crashes since it was modeled after the
Council et al. study (2005), meaning the
crash cost savings were overestimated.
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The Butler (2001) study was not accessible
to us; however, the NHTSA compendium
reported it but did not find a significant
safety benefit to cameras.
 Cunningham and Hummer (2004) merged
outcomes from RLC approaches with nonRLC approaches, meaning their findings are
not specific to RLC sites.
More recently, an analysis published in the
Journal of Trauma (Wahl et al., 2010) reported an
RLC program was ineffective in producing a safety
benefit. The authors suggested alternative
interventions should be pursued.
Some studies are reported to use "unscientific"
research methods. What does this mean?
The NHTSA's compendium (Decina et al.,
2007) criticized some RLC review studies for failing
to control for other sources of variation in the
outcome measure. The criticism stems from these
studies failing to account for other factors that can
increase or decrease crashes, such as changes in
traffic volume or a long running time trend of
declining injury crashes. A common error among
inexperienced researchers is to make simple before
and after comparisons. Decina et al. (2007) identified
the following RLC review studies as violating this
research tenet, meaning these reports should not be
used in RLC decision making:
 Cochrane Collaboration (Aeron-Thomas &
Hess, 2005);
 Transportation Research Board (McGee &
Eccles, 2003);
 Traffic
Injury
Prevention
(Retting,
Ferguson, & Hakkert, 2003);
 Road and Transport Research (Hakkert &
Gitelman, 2004); and
 Proceeding from Transportation Research
Board conferences (Flannery & Maccubbin,
2002; Persaud, Council, Lyon, Eccles, &
Griffith, 2005).
To illustrate the importance of including
meaningful variables in a study, Table 2 provides the
variables integrated into each of the five analyses that
we critiqued in 2008. The studies that integrated
relevant independent variables in the analysis found
RLCs were associated with increases in crashes and
injuries. This reveals the complexity of conducting
public health research because an outcome can be
incorrectly attributed to an intervention if variables
necessary to explain the outcome are excluded.
Another type of research flaw in some RLC
studies is the use of a process measure, such as
violations or traffic citations, instead of an actual
safety outcome, e.g., crashes or injuries. Unlike
Florida Public Health Review, 2011; 8:1-9.
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crashes, citations are "endogenous," meaning
officials responsible for issuing citations directly
control the number issued. For example, Retting,
Williams, Farmer, and Feldman (1999) studied
violations, not crashes. In contrast, Wahl et al. (2010)
analyzed violations and crashes and found violations
decreased following RLC use, but crashes did not,
meaning RLCs were ineffective in reducing crashes.
Also, Lum and Wong (2003) studied stopping
propensity at yellow lights, without analyzing the
association between stopping propensity and crashes.
It is not possible to make conclusions about safety
associated with RLCs if the impact on crashes and
injuries is not evaluated.
Is there an economic incentive in using RLCs?
RLC vendors and government entities clearly
can receive an economic benefit from cameras, in
addition to automobile insurance companies that use
RLC tickets as a basis for increasing a driver's
insurance rate. However, RLCs are merely an
expense for motorists. Even if using the FHWA study
(Council et al, 2005), which estimated annual crash
cost savings per RLC site as $38,845 (excluding the
cost of fatal crashes), it affirms RLCs are
economically disadvantageous to motorists. The
estimated savings must be considered relative to the
cost to motorists to achieve the savings. For example,
in Temple Terrace, Florida, RLCs were installed in
two directions at two intersections, for a total of four
RLC sites. If believing the estimated annual savings
of $38,845 per site, the annual estimated crash cost
savings to Temple Terrace drivers and/or their
insurance companies would be $155,380 ($38,845
per site, multiplied by four sites). In the first year,
21,000 RLC tickets were issued in Temple Terrace,
primarily to drivers making right turns (Shopes,
2009; Cohn, 2009). At $125 per citation, the cost
assessed to ticketed drivers was $2.6 million, which
greatly exceeds the estimated crash cost savings of
$155,380. This difference is an extremely adverse
cost-to-benefit relationship for affected motorists,
particularly as crashes were reported to increase at
Temple Terrace RLC sites. The use of RLCs has a
double negative effect for motorists, as they are put
more at risk for both a fine and a crash.
Citations can become a taxation method. A
study by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
evaluated ticketing in North Carolina over a 14-year
period, and found the issuance of tickets increased in
the year following a decline in municipality revenues.
The authors concluded tickets are not just used for
public safety, but also to generate revenue (Garrett &
Wagner, 2006). As a taxation method, RLCs are
highly inefficient due to the large percentage of
revenues that accrues to private out-of-state vendors,
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which diminishes funds available within a
community for investments and/or consumer
purchases, thereby reducing the volume of money
flowing through local businesses.
Due to the adverse cost-to-benefit relationship
for motorists, citizens in some communities have
placed referendums on local ballots, allowing voters
to decide on banning RLCs in their community. For
example, in November 2010, voters in Houston,
Texas, voted to ban RLCs, which had produced more
than $44 million in fines from 2006 to 2010
(Pinkerton & Olson, 2010).

is the following distance guide recommended in the
Official Florida Driver's Handbook (Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 2010).
However, since the range for driver reaction times to
braking includes two seconds, the trailing driver's
brakes can engage at or beyond the same place on the
road where the forward vehicle's brakes engaged, and
a rear-end crash is likely to occur if the trailing
vehicle requires a longer stopping distance. The
forward driver's ability to quickly stop affects the
distance available to trailing drivers, making abrupt
stops hazardous.

If RLCs are associated with large increases in
rear-end crashes, does this imply that drivers are
following too closely?
Rear-end crashes can occur even when trailing
drivers are abiding by speed limits and following
distance guides, which is explained using Florida's
rear-end presumption law and the mathematics
underlying rear-end crashes. Since 1958, Florida case
law holds a rebuttable presumption that the trailing
driver in a rear-end collision is the sole cause of an
accident (McNulty v. Cusack, 1958). One established
rebuttal to this presumption is abrupt and arbitrary
braking in accelerating traffic. The Florida Supreme
Court ruled: "Abrupt and arbitrary braking in
bumper-to-bumper, accelerating traffic is an
irresponsible and dangerous act that invites a
collision...It is a sudden stop by the preceding driver
at a time and place where it could not reasonably be
expected by the following driver that creates the
factual issue" (Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc.,
2000).
This ruling acknowledges the hazards of abrupt
stops. Unfortunately, RLCs encourage abrupt stops,
which are not always anticipated by trailing drivers.
Abrupt braking is dangerous because drivers attempt
to stop as quickly as possible, yet drivers need
different distances to stop due to differences in driver
reaction times and in distances needed by different
types of vehicles to stop.
Stopping has three basic steps: (1) the driver's
perception time to changing road conditions that
require braking followed by the reaction time to
initiate braking, (2) the vehicle response time to
engage the brakes, and (3) the distance needed to stop
once the brakes engage, which is determined by
speed, road conditions, vehicle type, and tire quality.
The total time for driver perception and reaction can
range from about one to two seconds, which means a
trailing driver closes the distance to the forward
vehicle in the process of braking, before their brakes
engage. Vehicles are separated by two seconds of
driving time if using the "Two Second Rule," which

Why would RLCs not reduce red light running
crashes?
Of the seven studies identified as best in the
NHTSA compendium, only Garber et al. (2007)
specifically analyzed crashes caused by red light
running, as the others used the broader category of all
angle crashes, regardless of the cause. Using EB
analysis, Garber et al. found no significant change in
red light running crashes at RLC sites. A possible
explanation is that the majority of red light running
crashes result from unintentional, rather than
intentional, red light running. For example, when
intentional red light running occurs immediately after
the signal changing to red, cross traffic has not been
released and the likelihood of a crash is low. In
contrast, unintentional red light running is hazardous
because cross traffic can be in the intersection when
the infraction occurs. The failure of RLCs to reduce
red light running crashes is consistent with crashes
occurring from unintentional red light running.
Further, the Garber et al. (2007) study reveals that
angle crashes are not a good proxy for red light
running crashes since they found red light running
crashes did not significantly change at RLC sites,
whereas angle crashes significantly increased.
Understanding root causes of red light running
crashes (e.g., intentional versus unintentional
infractions, driving under the influence, or traffic
signal or intersection defects) is necessary to advance
remedies that are specific to the problem. In contrast,
RLC advocates presume red light running crashes
occur from willful red light running.
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Does a mutually agreeable resolution exist among
RLC proponents and opponents?
When the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) identified motor vehicle safety as
one of the top 10 public health accomplishments of
the 20th Century, it was, in part, attributed to the
federal government being given the authority in 1966
to advance safety by establishing standards for roads
and intersections (CDC, 1999). The Federal Highway
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Table 2. Variables Included in RLC Evaluations Critiqued in 2008
Found RLCs Associated with Increased
Crashes/Injuries
Burkey &
Garber
Obeng
et al.*
Synectics*
Average daily traffic volume

X

X

X

Amber (yellow) signal time

X

X

Set per
regulations

Speed limit on major road

X

X

Left turn lanes on road

X

X

Through lanes on number of lanes

X

X

X (month)

X (year)

Time
Percent of trucks on major road

Reported a Safety
Benefit to RLCs
Council
Retting &
et al.
Kyrychenko
One volume
used for all
time periods

X

All-red clearance interval

X

Right turn lane

X

Sidewalk at intersection

X

Solid median at intersection

X

Pedestrian signal at intersection

X

No left or right turn on red signs

X

Snow

X

Precipitation

X

*Garber et al. and Synectics Transportation Consultants accounted for intersection geometry in selecting comparison
intersections, therefore their statistical analysis did not need to incorporate these (control) variables.
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Administration's Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices (2009) establishes standards to achieve
uniformity in traffic control throughout the nation.
Federal standards are needed regarding RLC
programs to assure intersection safety, even though
RLCs were not found to be an evidence-based safety
intervention in studies identified as the best RLC
research (Decina et al., 2007). Such standards would
not preclude states from enacting laws that prohibit
the use of RLCs, as some states have already done:
Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, West Virginia, and Wisconsin
(Copeland, 2010), or establishing more stringent
standards regarding yellow light timings, as occurred
in Georgia.
Instead of establishing standards for RLCs, the
FHWA and NHTSA (2003) issued "guidelines" that
recommend
an
engineering
analysis
and
improvements prior to considering RLCs, but did not
mandate such. Consequently, RLCs can be used at
intersections with engineering defects, which, if
corrected, would all but eliminate red light running. It
is a false dichotomy to assume the existence of only
two alternatives, to either do nothing or use RLCs, as
the evidence-based remedy is to make engineering
improvements, particularly lengthening yellow light
timings.
As reported in the Office of the House Majority
Leader's report (2001), federal standards for traffic
signal timings were relaxed in 2000, allowing for
shorter yellow light timings while permitting the use
of enforcement (tickets) and making the all-red
clearance interval optional. These changes were
contrary to accepted safety standards, but necessary
to allow RLC programs to be profitable, as well as to
create the appearance of an epidemic of red light
running for the public. The former standards must be
restored and strengthened if the goal is to maximize
public safety.
RLC proponents have said they agree with
correctly engineered intersections. If true, they
should also agree with restoring the former standards
and requiring an engineering analysis, with any
indicated improvements, prior to consideration of
RLCs. Further, full disclosure of the number of "red
light running" crashes at an intersection, as a
consideration for implementation of RLCs, should be
required to prohibit the obfuscation that occurs by
reporting angle crashes or total crashes, as the
majority are typically unrelated to red light running.
At
present,
the
Federal
Highway
Administration's (FHWA) web site, titled "Red Light
Cameras/Automated Enforcement" (2010), creates
confusion about RLC effectiveness. The FHWA web
site states RLCs reduce the "number of red light
Florida Public Health Review, 2011; 8:1-9.
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running crashes," and provides a link to the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety's web site, which is an
association funded by automobile insurance
companies. Oddly, the FHWA web site does not
reference the two studies identified as among the best
RLC studies in the NHTSA compendium (Decina,
2007), which adhered to scientific research methods.
Both concluded RLCs were associated with increases
in crashes and injuries. They were conducted in
Virginia (Garber et al., 2007) and North Carolina
(Burkey & Obeng, 2004). In 2008, by email, we
suggested the FHWA include these studies on their
web site. An email response was received from the
FHWA's Office of Safety Design (D. Warren,
personal communication, June 13, 2008), which
stated the following intentions:
We intend to add links to technical reports on this
topic that were prepared using federal funds
including the Virginia and North Carolina reports
you mentioned as well as a recent worldwide critical
evaluation of results published by NHTSA.
Although this response was sent more than two
years ago, the FHWA web site has not been modified
to include the two credible studies.
A parallel problem has emerged with the use of
speed cameras, suggesting a need for improved
federal standards to assure speed limits are correctly
set. The FHWA official who contacted us also
informed us that, similar to RLCs, roadway
engineering can be manipulated to increase speed
camera tickets by setting speed limits that are less
than what safety requires. The FHWA official
explained this increases the percentage of people who
are defined as speeders, thereby increasing the
number of speed camera tickets issued as drivers
choose speeds perceived as safe, not always attending
to changes in posted speed limits.
It is important for the public at large and federal,
state, and local officials to understand that motor
vehicle safety is advanced through evidence-based
methods. Attempts to generate revenue through
traffic citations are directly contrary to public safety
since infractions are increased by improper roadway
engineering, creating hazards and expense for the
public.
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